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Abstract 
Based on his proposed alternative theoretical framework for South-South trade as a vehicle 
for industrialization and development (Shafaeddin,2010) and refuting the “de-coupling” 
thesis—that is, the East Asian countries are decoupled from the business cycle in developed 
countries, the author analyses the merits and shortcomings of China’s regional trade with its 
partners. Moreover, considering the growing weight of China in the global production 
network and international trade he proposes policies for the future of industrialization and 
development of the partner countries for strengthening the role of China as a growth “pole”. 
He suggest, inter alia, the need for industrial collaboration among the low-income countries, 
which benefit less than others from the dynamics of the Chinese economy as a “hub”, 
complemented by adjustment assistance by China and NIEs. In order to upgrade their 
industrial structure, and reduce their vulnerability to changes in the economic strategy of 
China and the business cycles in developed countries, he also proposes technological 
cooperation among other main partner countries. These countries are involved in production 
sharing in a limited number of electric and electronic products for exportation to the third 
markets in developed countries. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* The author is a development economist affiliated with the Institute of Economic Research, 
University of Neuchatel, Switzerland. He is the former head of the Macroeconomics and 
Development Policies Branch, UNCTAD, and author of many articles on industrialization and 
development policies in international journals. His books include Trade policy at the 
Crossroads, Recent Experience of Developing Countries (Macmillan, 2005) and 
Competitiveness and Development (Anthem Press, forthcoming). This paper is developed 
mainly based on the earlier work of the author (Shafaeddin, 2008). The author would like to 
thank the participants of the conference on ‘The future of trade relations in the global South’, 
for their comments, but he remains responsible for any shortcomings. The author can be 
contacted at: M.Shafaeddin@Gmail.com or  m.shafaeddin@shafaeddin.com. 
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I. Introduction 
We have shown elsewhere (Shafaeddin, 2010) that the theoretical literature on the rationale 
for South-South trade is not satisfactory. The Neo-liberals argue against South-South trade 
regarding it inefficient. They argue that North-South trade according to the principle of static 
comparative cost advantage and free flow of international trade would involve higher gains. 
The opponents of the Neo-liberals have not come up with a strong theoretical rationale in 
favour of South-South trade. We have provided an alternative theoretical framework and the 
rationale for South-South trade as a vehicle for industrialization and development. Our 
argument is based on a combination of four building blocks: the extension of the “vent for 
surplus theory”; dynamic comparative cost advantage, scarcity of resources needed for 
industrialization and development; proactive industrial policy for collective division of labour 
and specialization through industrial collaboration (Shafaeddin, 2010) 
In the light of the above-mentioned framework, in this study we will analyses the merits 
and shortcomings of China’s regional trade with its partners in East, South and South East 
Asian (ESSEA) region, particularly low-income countries. Further, we will suggest ways in 
which the role of China as an industrial “pole” of industrialization and development can be 
enhanced through industrial collaboration among low-income countries, which benefit less 
than others from the dynamics of the Chinese economy as a “hub”, complemented by 
adjustment assistance by China and NIEs. Further, refuting the “de-coupling” thesis—that is, 
the East Asian countries are decoupled from the business cycle in developed countries—we 
will suggest the need for technological cooperation among countries which are involved in 
production sharing in order to upgrade their industrial structure and reduce their vulnerability 
to dependence on China, as a “hub” and the third market in developed countries. 
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To do so, in section II we will refer briefly to the dynamism of the Chinese economy,  
as a market and source of supply for South-South regional trade in ESSEA mainly through 
production sharing, particularly in electrical and electronic products. We will show, however, 
that the trade relation of China with the countries of the ESSEA region reveals three main 
shortcomings as far as industrialization and development of these countries is concerned. 
First, China’s trade in these products is concentrated in trade with the first-tier NIEs and, to 
some extent, with the second-tier NIEs. The low-income countries of the region have 
benefited little from the dynamism of the Chinese market. Second, main China’s partner 
countries in the region have become vulnerable to the risks of dependence on the Chinese 
market, as a hub, because of its exposure to external shocks and vulnerability to changes in 
economic situation in developed countries. Third, there has not been sufficient technological 
development by the second-tier NIEs in order to prepare themselves for the ultimate changes 
in the Chinese economy as their market for parts and components (P&C). To deepen their 
industrialization they need to upgrade their technological capabilities.  
Section III is devoted to the discussion on de-coupling and vulnerability of East Asian 
countries to global business cycles and other short-and long-run risks related to changes in 
Chin’s development strategy. In Section IV, policies for integration of low-income countries 
and upgrading of other ESSEA countries through regional cooperation will be discussed. The 
last section will conclude the study. 
II. China as a regional  industrial “pole” 
a. China’s economic dynamism and trade performance  
Since the early 1980s China has been the fastest growing economy in terms of GDP, MVA 
and fixed capital formation and international trade, particularly manufactured goods (table 1). 
As a result, it accounts for a significant share of global merchandise trade in various products 
(both exports and imports), except foods, (table 2). When Hong Kong is included, in 2008, 
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China became the largest global exporter and the second world importer, after the USA. It 
also accounts for nearly a quarter of exports and over one-fifth of imports of developing 
countries (table 2).  
Table 1: Annual average of growth of trade of China and developing countries (1995-2008) 
Region 
 
Non Fuel 
 
Non fuel 
(SITC 0 
to 8 less 
3) 
Fuel 
(SITC 
3) 
Total 
(SITC 0 
to 9) 
Food (SITC 
0 + 1 + 22 + 
4) 
Raw materials Manufacturing 
(SITC 5 to 8 less 
68) Agriculture (SITC 2 - 22 
- 27 - 28) 
Minerals 
(SITC 27 + 
28 + 68) 
 (%) 
 
Exports  
1. China 9.3 7.1 19.4 21.5 20.7 14.2 20.5 
2. Developing Asia 
including China 7.2 6.4 15.1 11.9 11.8 15.5 12.4 
3. Developing 
countries excluding 
China 
7.0 6.0 14.0 8.8 9.1 15.9 10.6 
4. Developing 
countries including 
china 
7.2 6.1 14.4 11.5 11.2 15.9 12.1 
World 6.4 4.7 11.9 8.4 8.3 16.1 9.2 
  Imports 
  
              
1. China 14.8 16.0 29.3 18.9 19.3 30.2 20.2 
2. Developing Asia 
including China 7.5 7.4 16.9 10.0 10.2 18.9 11.1 
3. Developing 
countries excluding 
China 
6.6 3.6 12.2 8.1 8.2 16.9 9.1 
4. Developing 
countries including 
china 
7.3 6.8 16.2 9.6 9.7 18.2 10.6 
World 6.5 4.1 11.8 8.4 8.3 16.4 9.2 
 
       
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Calculated by the author based on UNCTAD (2009) and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, database. 
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Table 2: Percentage Share of China in world trade (2008) 
Region 
  
Non Fuel 
  
Non fuel 
(SITC 0 
to 8 less 
3) 
Fuel 
(SITC 3) 
Total 
(SITC 
0 to 9) 
Non fuel 
(SITC  
0 to 8  
less 3) Food 
(SITC 0 + 
1 + 22 + 4) 
Raw materials Manufactur
ing (SITC 5 
to 8 less 
68) 
Agriculture 
(SITC 2 - 22 - 
27 - 28) 
Minerals 
(SITC 27 
+ 28 + 68) 
(%) 
Value 
(b.USD) 
 Exports 
 Share in world:  
1. China 3.3 28 3.6 12.7 10.6 1.2 9.0 1,399 
2. Developing Asia including 
China 18.1 21.3 17.6 31.2 28.8 34.8 29.8 3,809 
3. Developing countries 
excluding China 32.3 30.6 36.2 23.0 24.8 53.8 29.6 3,289 
4. Developing countries 
including china 35.6 33.4 39.8 35.7 35.4 55.0 38.7 4,688 
Share in developing 
countries: 
 
  
5. Share of China in 
Developing Asia 18.0 13.3 20.3 40.7 36.7 3.5 30.3   
6. Share of China in 
Developing countries. 9.2 8.5 8.9 35.5 29.8 2.2 23.3   
World: values at end year 
Billions USD 1,101 225 660 10,467 13,243 2,636 
15,87
9   
  Imports 
Share in world:   
1. China 4.3 15.9 18.8 7.0 7.2 6.0 7.0 963 
2. Developing Asia including 
China 20.4 34.5 39.9 25.6 26.1 27.9 26.4 3,475 
3. Developing countries 
excluding China 28.1 26.2 26.5 27.5 27.6 28.8 27.8 3,671 
4. Developing countries 
including china 32.4 42.0 45.3 34.5 34.8 34.8 34.8 4,634 
Share in developing 
countries:  
  
  
5. Share of China in 
Developing Asia 21.2 46.0 47.2 27.2 27.7 21.5 26.6   
6. Share of China in 
Developing countries. 13.3 37.7 41.5 20.2 20.8 17.2 20.2   
World: values at end year 
Billions USD 1,147 235 737 10,487 13,323 2,822 
16,14
5   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Calculated by the author based on UNCTAD (2009) and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, database. 
 
Trade in manufactured goods, has been the most dynamic element of China’s trade 
with ESSEA (table 3). Nevertheless, on the whole China has been more of a market for 
exports of ESSEA, than a source of supply for their imports (table 4). Instead, the USA and 
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Europe, in particular, have been the most dynamic market for exports of China. Such a pattern 
of trade is influenced mainly by trade in information technology (IT) products and by the role 
of China as a “hub” in the international trade of the ESSEA region (see below).  
Table 3: Direction of trade of China, 1995-2008 
 Exports Imports 
 Shares (%) Growth rate Share (%) Growth rate  
Groups 1995 2008 95-08 1995 2008 95-08 
Developed 
countries: 
52.3 51.8 19.1 55.9 35 14.2 
     Europe  14.2 21.4 23.1 16.5 10.9 14.7 
     USA 16.6 18.6 20.2 12.2 6.7 13.1 
     Japan 19.1 8.2 11.7 21.9 12.4 13.3 
     Others 2.4 3.7 23.2 4.3 5 19.8 
Developing 
countries:  
46.3 43.8 18.7 38.7 53.8 21.5 
     of which     
     ESSEA 
40.5 31.3 16.9 33.9 38 19.5 
Others* 1.4 4.4 30.2 3.8 3.1 16.6 
Total 100 100 ---- 100 100 ---- 
Mimeo: Value 
($b.) 
149 1,469 19.3 132 1197 18.4 
Note: *Transitional economies and Oceania 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2009), table 2.1 
 
Table 4: Annual average growth rate of exports of various Asian trade blocs (%), (1990-2008) 
  Destination (importer) 
Exporters 
   
ASEAN 
(10) 
SAARC 
(7) 
APTA 
(6) 
Total China 
  
Developing 
economies 
excl. China 
China  21.08 22.48 17.95 21.92 - 16.46 
ASEAN  12.2 14.2 18.3 13.5 24.1 12.3 
SAARC  15.3 15.9 14.1 15.8 31.8 16.3 
APTA  16.4 17.2 24.1 20.7 33.1 14.5 
Total (ASEAN, SAARC, APTA)  13.46 15.84 20.71 14.47 21.92 11.93 
Developing economies excluding 
China  
11.3 11.9 15.6 13.7 17.5 10.8 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Calculated by the author based on UN COMTRADE database. 
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Note that imports of China from members of various trade blocs in ESSEA region has 
increased faster than their intra-bloc trade (tables 4). As a result, the importance of China not 
only as a source of supply of imports, but also as a market for exports of various trade blocs 
has increased significantly (table 5). Such a development implies that factors other than 
preferential trade agreements must have been at work in the expansion of regional trade in 
general and the regional trade of China with the countries of the ESSEA in particular. 
Compare e.g., the data on trade of China with SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation) and intra-trade of SAARC.  China has had trade agreements with ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Nations) and APTA (Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement) since 
2002 and 2001, respectively, but not with SAARC. Yet, imports of China from SAARC have 
grown over two times faster than the intra-bloc trade of SAARC (table 4). Further, the 
exceptionally high rate of growth of intra-bloc trade of APTA is due to the involvement of 
China in the related regional agreement; China accounted for over half of intra-bloc trade of 
members of APTA in 2008 (table 5).  
Table 5: Matrix of trade of China with various economic groups in ESSEA (%),  
1995-2008 
  
Destination (importer) 
Exporters  
  
ASEAN 
  
SAARC 
  
APTA 
  
Total 
  
China 
  
Developing 
economies 
excl. China 
China 
 
1995 7.0 1.7 5.6 12.2  46.3 
2008 7.8 3.1 7.5 15.8  43.8 
ASEAN 
 
1995 24.4 2.2 7.6 28.2 2.7 43.8 
2008 25.4 4.1 17.4 43.1 9.6 50.0 
SAARC 
 
1995 6.4 4.7 6.4 12.2 1.0 32.6 
2008 7.5 6.3 15.9 25.8 9.2 45.9 
APTA 
 
1995 9.8 2.1 6.8 15.6 3.0 41.1 
2008 8.6 3.2 11.7 20.8 5.3 42.8 
 Total (ASEAN, 
SAARC, APTA)  
1995 16.0 2.2 6.9 23.4 3.0 43.1 
2008 13.9 3.6 13.5 28.0 7.4 45.2 
 Developing 
economies 
excluding China 
1995 11.2 1.9 10.4 21.1 6.5 33.6 
2008 10.3 2.8 19.5 30.4 13.8 36.2 
 
Source: Based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009. 
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b. Structure of imports of China 
We have looked into the origins of imports of China from the main trade blocs in the ESSEA 
region (ASEAN and SAARC) as shown in tables 6 and 7. Table 6 also shows the data for 
India as a separate item because of its size. The tables indicate first of all that manufactured 
goods, particularly SITC 7 items, and minerals and metals have been the most dynamic 
imports of China from ESSEA.  
Secondly, When India is excluded from SAARC, other members of the regional group 
(all are low-income countries) benefit little from the dynamism of China’s market. In fact, 
India alone accounts for about 76 per cent and 99 per cent of imports of manufactured goods 
and SITC 7 products of China from SAARC respectively. The remaining countries, excluding 
Pakistan, account for only over 2 per cent of the China’s imports of these products from 
SAARC (table 7). Similar tendencies are observed in the case of low-income country 
members of ASEAN (table 7). 
Therefore, it appears that the level of development and the degree of industrialization, 
thus the supply capabilities, of the partner countries, are important factors in the expansion of 
imports of China from countries of the region.   
Finally, two main SITC items, mainly electric and electronic products, account for the bulk of 
China’s import of manufactured goods from countries where manufactured goods constitute the bulk 
of  China’s import. Such trade pattern makes them vulnerable to the business cycle in the third 
markets, i.e. markets of developed countries as will be explained shortly.  
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Table 6: Imports of China from ASEAN 10 and SAARC, 1995-09 ($m) 
 
Items  
Total 
 
Non-fuel 
Manufactured  
Ores 
&Metal 
 
Ag.R.Mat. 
 
Food 
2 Main  SITC 
 Items* 
 
Total (SITC 
6+8-68) 
 
SITC 7 
Others (light 
manufactured) 
ASEAN 10:  
Total value 
(2009) 
106713.9 93574.5 74932.5 56226.5 8466.1 5350.6 4944.5 8214 40560 
(SITC 776 &,752) 
Share in Non-
fuel(2009) 
114 100 80.1 60.1 9 5.7 5.3 8.8 43.3 (54.1) 
Growth rate 
(1995-09 
23 24 27 32 14 30 16 16 47.5 
SAARC 
Total value 
(2009) 
1519.9 15095.6 4685.4 718.8 2783.2 9254.7 628.3 506.5 1443.8 
(SITC 651&667) 
Share in Non-fuel 
(2009) 
100.6 100 31 4.8 18.4 61.3 4.2 3.4 6.5 (20.9) 
Growth rate 
(1995-09) 
28.8 29 20.9 39.7 16.3 41.4 30.8 10 5.3 
India          
Total value(2009) 13714.3 136190 3551 709.8 1716.5 9106.7 508.9 431.8 284.5 
(SITC512& 682) 
Share in Non-
fuel(2009) 
100.6 100 26.1 5.2 12.6 66.8 3.7 3.2 2.1(8) 
Share of India in 
imports  of China 
from SAARC 
90.2 90.2 75.7 98.7 61.6 98.4 81 85.2  
Note: *Figures in brackets are shares of the item in imports of manufactured goods of China from the regions/country. 
Sources: Calculated by the author, based on UN, COMTRADE Database.
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Table 7: Imports of China from individual countries 
 
 
 
Countries 
Value ($m) Shares of individual countries in 
China’s imports of various product 
groups from the relevant regional 
trading group 
% of two main 
products in China’s 
imports of manuf. 
goods from the 
country 
Total Non-
Fuel 
Non-
fuel 
Man. SITC 
7 
Others 
(light 
Manuf.) 
Share 
(%) 
SITC 
ASEAN:  
Malaysia 32330.7 29718 31.7 32.9 37.2 20.4 70.5 776,752 
Thailand 24896.9 23715.9 25.3 26.6 25.4 27.3 50.5 “   ” 
Singapore 17798.6 14868 15.9 18.8 15.3 24.5 34.5 “   “ 
Philippines 11946.6 11894.3 12.7 14.1 17.4 6 70.5 “   “ 
Indonesia 13663.8 9395.8 10 4.8 3 11.1 17.2 “   “ 
Vietnam 4746.7 2989.1 3.2 2.4 1.5 9.4 15.2 764,776 
Myanmar 646.1 588.6 0.6 0.13 0.01 1.1 0.8 764,621 
Lao 367.3 365.8 3.6 6.2 nil 0.02 nil 682 
Cambodia 36.4 36.9 0.03 0.02 nil 0.4 nil  
Brunei 282 1.9 nil nil 0 nil nil  
   Total   100 100 100 100   
SAARC:  
India 13714.3 13619 90.2 75.8 98.7 61.6 82 682,512 
Pakistan 1260.2 1260.2 8.3 21.9 0.07 35.2 14.7 583,512 
Bangladesh 140.7 140.7 0.9 1.6 0.12 2.24 16.1 512,611 
Sri-Lanka 70.2 70.1 0.5 0.63 1.04 0.68 2.5 512,611 
Nepal 5.3 5.3 nil 0.1 nil 0.15 1.4 611,741 
Maldives 0.1 0.1 nil 0.003 nil nil nil nil 
Bhutan 0,05 0.05 nil nil nil 0 nil nil 
   Total   
 
     
Source: Calculated by the author, based on UN, COMTRADE Database. 
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c. Nature of production sharing and its role in East Asian  trade 
Production sharing is a form of industrial collaboration and intra-industry trade whereby the 
process of production is fragmented into various P&C that are produced in different countries, 
crossing borders to another country for assembly. The intensity of such a vertical production 
chain depends on the nature of the product involved, which in turn depends positively on the 
following factors: technical divisibility of the product, factor intensity of its process of 
production, technical complexity of each process and the value-to-weight ratio of the product 
(Lall et al., 2004). SITC 7 items, particularly ICT and automobile products, have many of 
these characteristics. For example, for three SITC 7 items, P&C accounted for 56.5 per cent of 
their world exports, 80.8 per cent of exports of East Asia and 82.5 per cent of exports of 
China. These items include: office machine and data processing products (SITC 75), 
Telecommunication and sound recording (SITC 76) and Electric machinery etc (SITC77) 
(Athukorala et al., 2010: table 5). 
Production sharing is facilitated by the liberalization of trade and FDI, a reduction of 
transaction costs due to reduced costs of transportation and communication (Arndt, 2002) and 
the involvement of TNCs as a source of technology and a marketing channel. Meanwhile, the 
possibility of involvement of a country in production sharing also depends on capabilities of 
its domestic firms and its availability of skills, transport and communication infrastructure, 
institutions and the necessary back-up services ((Lall et al., op. cit.)—all of which are lacking 
in low-income countries and political stability as well as capability in governance (World 
Bank, 2009).  
Trade in P&C has been a dynamic source of global trade in manufactured goods, 
particularly ICT products (table 8). Accordingly, during 1992/93-2005/06 over 57 per cent of 
global growth in ICT products originated from P&C as against about 24 per cent for 
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manufactured goods as a whole, 43 per cent for SITC 7 products, 10.4 per cent for electric 
machinery and 6.7 for light manufactured goods (SITC 8) (Athukorala and Menon, 2010: 
table 1). As a result, the share of ICT in global trade in P&C has increased from nearly 43 per 
cent in 1992/93 to 52.6 per cent in 2005/6 (loc. cit.). 
The sharp increase in intra-regional trade in the East Asia region has been also largely 
due to the expansion of intra-industry trade, particularly in skill-, capital- and/or technology-
intensive goods such as electronic products and other machinery and transport equipment 
(SITC 7) (Ng and Yeats, 2003). As countries develop and industrialize the prospects for 
regional trade increases. In particular, China has been increasingly expanded its share of 
global and regional trade in P&C (table 8). 
d. The role of China in regional production sharing 
China is regarded in the literature as the leading country in terms of deepening of vertical 
intra-industry trade specialization (i.e., production sharing), and as the engine of export 
growth of the East Asian region (e.g., Kozo, Sazanami and Yu Ching, 2006; Lall and 
Albaladejo, 2004; Haltmaier et al., 2007). Apart from Japan, China has been the biggest 
importer of P&C of SITC 7 products, particularly electric and electronic ones, in the region as 
well as the most important exporter of related finished goods. This is because trade in P&C, 
particularly electrical and electronic P&C, has been one of the most dynamic elements of 
China’s trade in manufactured goods in general, including its regional trade with ESSEA 
(Pizarro and Shafaeddin, 2010). China has also become a net exporter of P&C. For example, 
according to one estimate, in 2005, trade in P&C accounted for about 30 per cent of China’s 
total exports and 41 per cent of its exports of machinery and equipment (Haltmaier et  al., 
2007: table 2). Trade in the 10 main items of P&C (mostly electrical and electronic goods) 
expanded even faster than those of total P&C (Pizarro and Shafaeddin, 2010).  
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Table 8: Importance of trade in P&C in trade in manufactured goods   
    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exports   Imports 
-------------------------      -------------------------------- 
           
        1992/93 2005/6  1992/3  2005/6  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Share of P&C in Global Manufacture Trade (%): 
 
  Total     18.9  22.3  19  22.3 
  SITC 7    36.6  40.7  36.6  40.7 
  ICT products   50.5  55.5  51.2  55.5 
Share of P&C in trade of ICT 
 products of PRC(%)   26.2  38.3  62.7  81.3 
 
Share of ICT in global trade of P&C      42.92          52.70 
 
Share of various groups  and China in global trade in P&C (%): 
Developing countries: of which:  23.8  46.1  30.3  48.4 
East Asia      30.1  40.6  24.4  38.1 
 Developing East Asia   (14.4)  (30.6)  (21.2)          (34.1) 
  PRC     (1.1)   (10.9)  ( 2.4)         (11.5) 
% Share of P&C in China’s trade with: 
World      17.5    39.3 
Developing East Asia    30.6    44.7 
ASEAN      35    47.1 
ASEAN 3     28.7    39.1 
------------------------------------- 
Sources:  Based on Athukorala & Menon (2010), Tables 1,2,3,4 
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Table 9: China’s trade in main parts and components and their corresponding finished products for main SITC 7 items (value $m). 
 
 
List of parts and components: 7169,759,7649,77129,772,77689,784,7929,7139,78539. 
List of corresponding finished products: 7169, 751&752, 764-7649, 771-77129, 776-77689, 722&781, 785-78539, 792-7929. 
Sources: Sources: Calculate by the author, based on UN, COMTRADE Data base. 
 
Countries 
Parts and components Corresponding finished products 
Imports Exports balance Imports Exports balance 
Value Share Value Share  Value Share Value Share Value 
Rep. of Korea 11908.0 16 7610 5.9 -4298 27658 15.3 13462 4.7 -14196 
Taiwan Province 5259.7 11.65 3600.0 2.79 -1659.7 32782 18.1 5256 1.8 -27526 
ASEAN 4 7623 10.75 6607 5.12 -1016 43607 24.1 10612 3.7 -32992 
Hong Kong (SAR) 1347.3 1.90 40240.5 31.21 38893.2 2446 1.4 54151 19 51705 
Rest of ASEAN 1851.4 2.61 4093.5 3.17 2242.1 5710 3.2 10955 3.9 5245 
India 125.3 0.18 2588.1 2.01 2462.8 99 0.1 5737 2 5638 
SAARC excl. India 0.9 00.0 477.2 0.37 476.3 7 0 1515 0.5 1508 
Total above 31115.7 43.90 65217.4 50.58 34101.7 112310 62 101527 35.7 -10783 
Total excl. Hong Kong 29768.4 42 24976.4 19.37 -4792 109864 60.6 47376 16.7 -62488 
Japan 20688.6 29.19 10747.9 8.34 -9940.7 24586 13.6 15574 5.5 -9012 
Others 19079.5 26.92 52981.5 41.09 33902 44238 24.4 167249  58.8 122957 
Total world 70883 100 128949 100 58066 181134 100 284249 100 103115 
Total world ex. Hong 
KONG 
69537.3 98.1 88708.5 68.7 19172.8 142240.3 98.6 230146 81 71252 
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Data for the regional trade of China in P&C and their corresponding finished products for 
SITC 7 items are exhibited in table 9, in which the countries/regions are ranked according to 
the value of imports of P&C in 2009. The data also includes total trade of China with 
ESSEA, excluding Hong Kong (SAR, China). Hong Kong is excluded because of its special 
situation as a major re-exporter of the related products imported from China and the 
discrepancies between the data reported by China and Hong Kong (SAR) as exporter and 
importer, respectively. Such discrepancies cannot be explained by transport costs alone. 
According to the table, first of all, China is not only a large market, but also a net 
importer of P&C and finished products from ESSEA even when Hong Kong (SAR, China) is 
excluded. Yet it is a net exporter to the rest of the world, particularly for finished products. 
Therefore, it acts as an export hub (bridge) for the ESSEA region; in 2009, 43 per cent of its 
imports of P&C originated from ESSEA while over 64 per cent of its finished products were 
exported to other countries (5.5 per cent to Japan and 58.8 mainly to the USA and Europe 
(table 8).  When Hong Kong is excluded the last figure increases to 64.3 per cent.  
e. Lack of integration of low-income countries 
All developing countries of the region have not benefited from the dynamism of the Chinese 
market to the same extent. Three groups can be distinguished in order of their importance as 
providers and markets for the selected products. The first group includes the Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan (Province of China). China’s trade balance with these economies is 
significantly negative for both P&C as well as finished products. They are major regional 
suppliers of sophisticated P&Cs and finished consumer goods and capital equipment to 
China.  
The second group consists of four ASEAN members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand (ASEAN 4). China is also a net importer of both P&C and finished products 
from these countries. Nevertheless, as far as finished products are concerned, the figure is 
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heavily influenced by imports from Singapore. Otherwise, China is a net exporter of finished 
goods to the other countries.  
The third group consists most of other ASEAN countries and members of SAARC. 
China’s import from the rest of ASEAN and members of SAARC is insignificant except for 
the Philippines and to some extent Vietnam. The Philippines have become an increasingly 
important exporter of electronic products since the late 1980s because of the involvement of 
Japanese and the United States TNCs. Three characteristics of the country have attracted FDI: 
its proximity to other East Asian countries involved in the production network; its ease of 
regional transport due to its vast coastal areas; and its low-wage and skilled manpower. Japan 
and the United States have been its main markets, but its exports of high-tech products to 
China have also increased significantly, from 1.3 per cent of its total exports in 2000 to 13 
per cent in 2005 (Haltmaier et al., 2005: 32-36). In 2009, imports of 7 main electric and 
electronic products, accounted for over 79 per cent and 89 per cent, respectively, of China’s 
imports from the Philippines, out of which, two products (SITC 776 and 752) accounted for 
63% and 71%, respectively.  
 
III. Vulnerability of ESSEA countries, or de-coupling 
The ESSEA countries which depend on the production sharing system, dominated by China, 
face a couple of short/medium and long run risks.  
a. Short/medium-run risks 
One short/medium run risk facing them is related to their exposure to the global business 
cycle, directly and through the “hub”, due to the fall in demand for finished IT products of 
China in the market of developed countries. It is a myth to believe that China (and East Asia) 
is decoupling with developed countries as argued by some (Anderson, 2007; Economist, 
2007; Bergsten, 2008). In fact, the link has intesified. Generally speaking, OECD countries 
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accounted for over 61 per cent of destination of processing exports of the East Asian region, 
out of which the USA and EU-19 accounted for  31.1 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively 
(Ma et al., 2009: table 2). The business cycle correlations of East Asian countries with China 
as well as developed countries have increased considerably as shown in table 10. The only 
exception is the correlation of direct trade of East Asia, excluding China, with G7. The 
correlation between growth in East Asia’s interregional exports and USA’s non-oil imports 
increased from -0.01 during the 1990s to 0.83 during 2000-August 2009 (Kim et al., 2010: 8).  
Table 10: Business cycle correlation of East Asiana countries 
 Pre-(1997/8) crisisb Post-crisisc 
Business cycle correlation with PRC: 
     East Asia excluding PRC -0.379 0.549 
     G7 -0.304 0.580 
     US -0.490 0.517 
     Japan -0.633 0.477 
Inter-regional Business Cycle correlation: 
     East Asia-G7 0.084 0.611 
     East Asia-Us 0.233 0.715 
     East Asia excluding PRC-G7 0.619 0.537 
     East Asia excluding PRC-US -0.345 0.724 
Notes: a: PRC, Hong Kong (SAR), Taipei, China, Indonesia, Rep. of Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. b: 1990 Q 1-1996 Q4. c: 2000Q1-2007Q2. 
Source: Kim et al., (2009: 37). 
Similarly, growth rates of exports of China to G3 (USA, EU and Japan) are “highly 
correlated with those of the PRC imports from the rest of East Asia” (Kim et al., 2010: 8). In 
other words, not only China itself is exposed to the business cycle in developed countries, but 
also are the Asian exporters of P&C via their exposure through China. Hence, East Asian 
countries and the US/European economies are “recoupling” rather than decoupling (Kim, et 
al., 2009).  
The argument on decoupling is based on an erroneous methodology of analysis in 
which the rates of growth of GDP of China and developed countries, rather than their 
deviation from the trend growth rates, are compared (Walti, 2009). 
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Another source of short-term risk is related to the interdependence of these countries 
as the correlation of business cycles between economies across the East Asian region has 
increased considerably since the mid-1980s (Zebregs, 2004: 14; Kim et al., 2009).1 
Development of bottlenecks in production of an item of P&C or a shock in one country may 
be transmitted to another country through the production sharing network, leading to 
slowdown in growth of other exporting countries.  
Yet further source of risk is the change in the exchange rate system in China. The 
Chinese currency is fixed and pegged to the US dollar with a band. A switch to floating 
exchange rate creates instability in export of P&C to China (Thorbecke, 2008). Recently, the 
band has been widened and there is a pressure on China to revalue its currency, or to switch 
from a fixed exchange rate system to a floating one. In the former case the appreciation of the 
currency makes Chinese exports more expensive reducing its demand for imports of P&C. At 
the same time it makes the imported price of P&C cheaper. The overall effects on exports of 
China, thus the demand for P&C, which is a derived demand, is not clear depending on the 
import intensity of exports and the behaviour of the pass-through of  the import price of P&C 
(Athukorala et. al., 2010 and Jangwanich, 2010). In East Asia, where importance of P&C in 
international trade has increased from 20 per cent in 1992 to about 41 per cent in 2008 (Kim 
et al., 2010: 9), the link between exports and exchange rate has weakened. P&C are less 
sensitive to changes in exchange rates. Meanwhile, it is also argued that devaluation by other 
East Asian countries does not necessarily affect China’s exports (Liao et al., 2010). This is 
because the complementarity effects of China’s exports (through imports of P&C) with most 
exporters of P&C are greater than their competitive effects with their exports of final 
products. Thus China would benefit from cheaper imports of P&C which accounted for 
nearly 29 per cent of its total exports from developing East Asian countries in 2005/06 
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(Athukorala et al., 2010). In East Asia, “world demand, FDI and production capacity have 
increased their importance in determining exports” (Jangwanich, 2010).  
 
b. Long-run risks 
The long-run risks are related to the slowdown of China’s imports of P&C from ESSEA for 
two different reasons: the substitution of domestically produced P&C for imports, and a shift 
from export-led growth to consumption-led growth, or a combination of both.  
China has been increasing its capabilities in production of P&C and expanding 
domestic value added in assembly operation particularly in ICT products (electric, electronic) 
and other items of SITC 7 group which are the main source of production sharing (Pizarro 
and Shafaeddin, 2010). As a result, its imports of P&C decelerated from annual average rate 
of about 44 per cent during 1992/3-2001/2 to 35.3 during 2001/2-2004/5 period despite 
acceleration of its exports of manufactured goods (Pizarro and Shafaeddin, 2010: table 4) . It 
has been improving its revealed comparative advantage in production and exports of P&C 
(Ibid: table 4 and Gallagher and Shafaeddin, 2010).  During 2005-2009, China’s imports of 
P&C for production of SITC 7 items declined in absolute terms, while their exports expanded 
rapidly; thus the balance of total trade in these products has improved by over 5 times (table 
11). 
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Table 11: Trade of China in P&C and their corresponding finished products for SITC 
7, (2005-2009) ($m.) 
 P&C Finished products 
 2005 
(1) 
2009 
(2) 
Ratio 
3=2:1 
2005 
(4) 
2009 
(5) 
Ratio 
6=5:4 
Total world 
Exports 97502 128949 1.32 199486 284249 1.42 
Imports 86185 70883 0.82 172618 181134 1.05 
Exports (X)-
Imports(M) 
11317 58066 5.1 26868 103115 3.84 
X-M/M (%) 13.1 81.9 6.25 15.3 56.9 3.7 
Total world excluding Hong Kong 
Exports 67611 88708.5 1.31 156375 230146 1.47 
Imports 84459 69537.3 0.82 170770 142240.3 0.83 
X-M -16848 19172.8 na -14395 87905.7 na 
(X-M)/M (%) -19.9 27.6 na -8.4 61.8 na 
ESSEA 
Exports 49327 65217.4 1.32 72592 101527 1.40 
Imports 29535 31115.7 1.05 94343 112310 1.19 
X-M 19792 34101.7 1.72 -21751 -10783 0.49 
(X-M)/M(%) 67 109.5 1.63 -0.23 -0.07 0.30 
ESSEA excluding Hong Kong 
Exports 19436 24975.4 1.28 29481 47376 1.6 
Imports 27809 29768 1.07 92495 109864 1.18 
X-M -8368 -4791.6 0.57 -63014 -62470 0.99 
(X-M)/M (%) -30 -16 0.53 -68.1 -56.8 0.83 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on UN, COMTRADE Database. 
So far, China’s imports of P&C from ESSEA region have been increasing both as a 
share of its total imports of P&C and in absolute terms—although the pace of the latter has 
been slow.2 Furthermore, the country’s export of finished products to the world as a whole 
expanded faster than its exports to ESSEA region. Hence, the role of China as a “hub” in the 
ESSEA region has been increasing. Nevertheless, as exports of P&C of China to ESSEA is 
increasing faster than its imports from the region, whether Hong Kong is included or not, 
(table 10), it is very likely that its role as a “hub” may become gradually less important in the 
future (Gallagher and Shafaeddin, 2010). 
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Shift to consumption-led growth 
One reason for a possible shift from export-led growth to consumption-led growth is the 
development of protectionism in the importing developed countries, particularly the USA 
with its growing trade imbalance with China (Akyuz, 2010; Kozo, Sazanami and Yu Ching, 
2006). If China wishes to continue its export growth at the rate of 20 t0 30 per cent a year, 
one has to take this risk seriously. Such rates of export growth  at a low base is not a cause for 
concern of the developed countries, but at a high base it is a different thing. Currently China’s 
exports exceed 1.4 trillion dollars. Hence, such a risk should not be underestimated.  
Optimistic appraisal of China’s strength reflected in its massive trade surplus 
underestimates its structural vulnerabilities (Fischer, 2010). China’s  “massive rerouting of 
East Asian centred international production networks” entailed development of trade deficit 
with East Asian countries and trade surplus with the USA and EU (Ibid.). The large volume 
of imports of developed countries from China makes China vulnerable to the risk of a 
tendency towards protectionism in the importing countries. If so, Chinese imports of P&C 
from the ESSEA region will be adversely affected. 
A shift from export-led growth to consumption-led growth may entail less import 
intensity as production of consumer goods for the domestic market is less import intensive 
than production of ICT products for the export market (Akyuz, 2010; Lall, 2004; Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2006).  
Currently, the X/GDP, the savings/GDP and I/GDP ratios of China are relatively high 
in comparison with those of the other ESSEA countries and they have been rising in recent 
years (Prasad, 2009). By contrast, its C/GDP ratio is lower, its Wage/GDP has not been 
keeping pace with labour productivity and its rural population suffer from inequality in 
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income and consumption with city dwellers. In fact, there are indications that a shift from 
export-led growth to consumption-led growth will also improve the distribution of income in 
favour of the lower-income strata through wages. According to an empirical study by Xing 
(2010: 1), “China’s export share of GDP has a positive effect on the enlargement of the upper 
half distribution”. Thus there is some scope for structural shift towards consumption-led 
growth. The related risk is, however, somewhat overstated. The experience of industrialized 
countries demonstrates that as countries industrialize, intra-industry trade in differentiated 
consumer goods as well as investment products also increases. During 1996-2008, the share 
of imports of P&C in total imports of China has declined (from about 35% to 25%), but the 
share of final products in its imports has changed little. More importantly,  during the same 
period, the share of final goods in imports from East and South East Asia has increased 
considerably—from about 35% to 55 % (Kim et. al., 2010: 14-15). Therefore any shift to 
consumption-led growth would also lead to further increases in China’s imports of these 
goods from the ESSEA region. It is also very likely that for a given growth rate of GDP, 
imports of raw materials and foods will also be accelerated 
 
IV: The future of regional trade; the questionable role of market 
Neither the integration of lower-income countries nor the technological upgrading of the 
second-tier NIEs is feasible through the operation of market forces alone. There is a need for 
policy initiatives by the governments of the region particularly in the case of low-income 
countries. 
There is a misconception about the role of the market in the expansion of regional 
trade in East Asia as it is believed that such an expansion has been market-driven (Kawai and 
Wignaraja, 2007). We have shown elsewhere that: the bulk of intra-regional trade in East 
Asia takes place through intra-firm trade,; that such trade was mostly policy driven resulting 
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from changes in the FDI policies of the governments of Japan and the East Asian countries, 
particularly after the Plaza accord of 1985 and active participations of Japanese firms. 
Japanese firms purchased the bulk of their input of goods and services from the local markets 
and local firms. By contrast, the US firms involved produced mostly for exporting to the 
United States. At the same time, the governments concerned built up the production 
capabilities of their local firms, developed their infrastructure and utilities and provided the 
facilities for necessary back-up services. China also adopted similar policies with the 
difference that initially, inward-FDI originated mainly from ethnic Chinese investors—
mainly Hong Kong (SARS), Taiwan Province of China and Singapore (Shafaeddin, 2008: 36-
37 and the sources reported therein). Between 70 to 80 per cent of cumulative inward FDI of 
China during 1990-2002 period originated from Hong Kong (SAR, China) and Taiwan 
Province of China depending on whether one uses China or these two territories as reporting 
trade partner (Ibid.: 37). 
 Although the pattern of expansion of the regional trade and industrialization in East 
Asia resembles the flying geese model (Akamatsu, 1961; Kasahara, 2004), the geese did not 
fly automatically either in Japan or at the regional level in East Asia. Various government 
policies played an important role in development of domestic capabilities in Japan and East 
Asian NIEs (Fan and Watanabe, 2006; Lall, 2004; Gallaher and Shafaeddin, 2010). The 
trickle-down effects of the process have also reached the second-tier NIEs, although it has not 
had sufficient impact on their technological development. Moreover, the low-income 
countries of the region were not a part of the flying geese process. 
As China upgrades its industrial structure, will it leave some low-technology intensive 
industries to create opportunities for low-income countries of the region? Although China has 
been improving its revealed comparative advantage in production and exports of technology-
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intensive products, it still remains, and will remain for the foreseeable future, a massive 
exporter of labour-intensive products.  
Moreover, currently, under new global economic conditions governed by market 
forces and liberalization, the policy space available to the low-income countries to follow 
similar policies followed by the NIEs to enhance capabilities of their local firms is limited. 
Hence, it is not clear whether the geese could easily fly over these economies to facilitate 
their industrialization through trickle-down effects of the dynamism of the Chinese economy. 
Neither is it clear whether market forces alone could induce technological upgrading of the 
second-tier NIEs.  
 
V: Policy implications for the future of industrialization of the region 
What sort of policy measure is required to enhance the positive impact of China’s South-
South regional trade on industrialization and development of the low-income countries and 
the exporters of P&C? In both cases, there are needs for some adjustment in the production 
and export structure of the countries concerned. Nevertheless, such adjustment requires 
proactive policies by the governments.  
Industrial collaboration by low-income countries 
In order to benefit from the dynamism of the Chinese economy as well as ESSEA region as a 
whole, the low-income countries need to expand their industrial supply capabilities. But, the 
expansion of the supply capabilities is faced with scarcity problems, including the scarcity in 
finance, skills, infrastructure, organization and entrepreneurship. Further, policies of regional 
investors do not favour them as outward FDI by NIEs is directed mainly to China and the 
ASEAN-4 (Isoga and Shibanuma, 2000). They need to mitigate their scarcity problem 
through industrial collaboration among themselves with some adjustment assistance by China 
and, possibly, NIEs (see Shafaeddin,2010). 
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Industrial collaboration can be facilitated by regional FDI by countries like China and 
NIEs as it will be beneficial to the host country as well as the investing countries as they are 
market seekers. The processing of raw materials before exporting to China could be one 
possibility, but it is not the only one. India’s investment cooperation with Nepal and Sri 
Lanka for production of manufactured goods is an example (Wishwanath, 2007: 2). 
Industrial collaboration is necessary but not sufficient. In addition to the need for 
industrial policy at the country level (Shafaeddin,2005), arrangements have to be made for 
the division of labour in required back-up services, export credit, information and the 
development of the necessary infrastructure, training and skills development, and business 
cooperation through chambers of commerce.  
Cooperation among countries concerned necessitates political will, harmonization of 
rules of origin as well as external assistance. Often, there are political problems in securing 
agreements among the countries for industrial collaboration. Each country may have its own 
individual interest as against the common interest of the group. Appreciation  by the partners 
of the ultimate benefits of such arrangements for individual countries requires dialogue and 
the dissemination of information and knowledge. The scarcity of financial and other 
resources also requires external financial and technical assistance: it is in the interest of China 
itself to provide such assistance. If China is faced with obstacles in expanding its markets in 
developed countries, it may be interested in expanding its regional market in ESSEA. Such 
expansion in low-income countries requires expansion of their effective demands which is, in 
turn, a function of their level of development and industrialization.  
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Technological collaboration 
The countries which rely on export of P&C to China needs, inter alia, to adjust their 
production/export structure by upgrading their technological and skill capabilities in order to 
reduce their vulnerabilities. One option is to emphasize production for the domestic market 
rather than exports. More recently in a shift from its traditional stance of propagating export-
led growth, the Managing Director of IMF also recommended that “Asia, which has until 
now relied heavily on exports for economic growth, needed to boost domestic investment and 
consumption” (Choonsik and Jong-woo, 2010). Such adjustment will also help the expansion 
of exports of differentiated products to China even if this country shifts to consumption-led 
growth.  
 Technological development requires, inter alia, R&D, skill development etc. Regional 
cooperation can help the countries concerned to attain their growth objective through division 
of labour and specialization in R&D and development of skills.  
The lack of skills and financial and technical resources prevents countries in the group 
to undertake research in a large number of areas individually. Large countries, such as China 
and India, are in a better position to do so. For example, India has succeeded to some extent 
in the particular case of pharmaceuticals and software industries; so has China in IT 
technology. Nevertheless, even for these countries the R&D/GDP ratios are far below those 
of developed countries (Gallagher and Shafaeddin, 2010). Therefore, the division of labour 
and specialization in technology development could help all countries of the group in 
advancing their technological capabilities. Attempts have been made by ASEAN and China 
to cooperate in research on ICT activities for which they have envisaged the establishment of 
an R&D centre for telecommunications equipment. Such initiatives need further extension. 
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There are a number of other areas in which China and other countries of the ESSEA 
region can cooperate. One is coordination of their policies for intensifying the technological 
spill-over of FDI. Another is cooperation on financial issues to reduce the risks of financial 
crisis. Having experienced the financial crisis of 1997/8, the East Asian countries have 
increased their currency reserves, developed on the Chiang Mai Initiative (a kind of 
“ASEAN, swap arrangement”) and a network of bilateral financial swap arrangements among 
ASEAN+3 countries (For details see Shafaeddin, 2008). Nevertheless, there are areas on 
which they can further expand their cooperation. One can mention a few: “stronger regional 
cooperation in monitoring and regulating financial markets”3; modalities of capital controls in 
the region; establishment of a regional South Bank and development of strategic energy 
reserves (Shafaeddin, 2008).  
V. Concluding remarks 
Based on our proposed framework for S-S cooperation (Shafaeddin,2010), in this 
paper we have looked into the implications of the dynamics of the Chinese economy for the 
expansion of regional South-South trade, and have shed some light on its merits and caveats 
and proposed some changes in the strategies of the ESSEA countries in the future.  
More specifically, it was shown that China has been a dynamic market and source of 
supply for South-South regional trade in ESSEA mainly through production sharing, 
particularly in electrical and electronic products. Nevertheless, the trade relation of China 
with the countries of the ESSEA region reveals three main shortcomings as far as its impact 
on industrialization and development of these countries is concerned. First, China’s trade in 
these products has been concentrated on trade with the first-tier NIEs and, to some extent, the 
second-tier NIEs. While low-income countries of the region have acted as a market for 
exports of China, they have benefited little from the dynamism of the Chinese market. 
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Second, through production sharing China’s regional partners have become 
vulnerable to the risks of dependence on the Chinese market, as a hub, because of its 
exposure to external shocks and vulnerability to the business cycle in developed countries. 
China depends mainly on the markets of developed countries for exports of the related 
finished-assembled-products. For example, in 2009, China’s imports of two items of P&C 
(SITC 776 and 752) from Malaysia amounted to over $17 billion (86 per cent of imports of 
manufactured goods from this country) accounting for about 17 per cent  of its total imports.  
Third, there has not been sufficient technological development by China’s trade 
partners which are involved in regional production sharing. They are also vulnerable  to the 
ultimate changes in the Chinese trade and development strategy. To deepen their 
industrialization they need to upgrade their technological capabilities.  
The regional agreements and market forces alone have not been responsible for the 
expansion of S-S trade in the region; trade agreements are necessary, but they are not 
sufficient. Demand and supply dynamism as well as policies of governments and TNCs have 
been among important contributory factors. In particular, the low industrial and skills 
capabilities have prevented their lower-income countries from getting involved in the rapid 
expansion of production sharing.  
Similarly, in the future also neither the integration of lower-income countries nor the 
technological upgrading of the second-tier NIEs is feasible through the operation of market 
forces alone. There is a need for proactive policy initiatives by the governments for regional 
cooperation.  
As the low-income countries have a common production and export structure, they 
have little prospects for expanding intra-regional trade. Such an expansion is to be policy-
driven. It can be achieved through industrial collaboration among themselves for building up 
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their supply capacity. There is also a need for cooperation, coordination and harmonization of 
their development and industrial policies with a view to achieve dynamic comparative 
advantage. Further, it is also in the interests of China, and other “market seekers” (NIEs), to 
provide them with adjustment assistance, in building up their supply capacity, skills, training 
facilities, and back-up services, etc.  
Another area for enhanced cooperation is R&D and technological capacity building 
by China and the second-tier NIEs for upgrading their industrial structure.  
The idea is to develop complementarity through the division of labour and 
specialization in different products and industries. By specialization and division of labour 
through industrial collaboration and/or cooperation in R&D, developing countries can 
overcome scarcity in complementary factors of production, and benefit from larger markets 
and scale economies. Instead of trade leading to division of labour and specialization, 
division of labour and specialization, in accordance with the principle of dynamic 
comparative advantage, is to lead to trade. The expansion of supply capabilities and S-S trade 
could, in turn, reduce the risk of dependence on markets of developed countries and improve 
their bargaining position in multilateral forums as well as in their bilateral trade relations with 
the developed countries.  % Value 
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0.448 during 2000-August 2009. When China is excluded, the relate figures are 0.007 and 0.446. 
2
 This is so, despite the fact that its share in total imports from ESSEA has declined as mentioned before. 
3
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